Positional Preferences: Efficiency and Distortions under Welfarist- and Paternalistic Governments by Wendner, Ronald & Ghosh, Sugata
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Positional Preferences: Efficiency and
Distortions under Welfarist- and
Paternalistic Governments
Ronald Wendner and Sugata Ghosh
Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University,
U.S.A. and University of Graz, Austria, Brunel University London,
U.K.
22 March 2017
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/77839/
MPRA Paper No. 77839, posted 23 March 2017 14:39 UTC
Positional Preferences: Efficiency and Distortions
under Welfarist- and Paternalistic Governments ?
Sugata Ghosha and Ronald Wendnerb
a Department of Economics and Finance, Brunel University London, U.K.
b Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, U.S.A.
and Department of Economics, University of Graz, Austria
Draft: 22 March 2017
Abstract. This paper analyzes the distortionary effects of positional preferences
when labor supply is exogenous under both a welfarist and a paternalistic govern-
ment. Extending the prior literature, reference levels may be partially exogenous
to the government (e.g., determined by consumption choices in a foreign country),
and individuals may be positional with respect to wealth in addition to consump-
tion. Neither consumption- nor consumption-cum-wealth positionality needs to
cause inter-temporal distortions under either welfare criterion. We derive necessary
and sufficient conditions for non-distortion of positional preferences. If those condi-
tions are not satisfied, the same reference levels of consumption and wealth can give
rise to under-saving or to over-saving – depending on the extend to which the ref-
erence levels are exogenous to the government. Moreover, we provide conditions for
which positional preferences for wealth and consumption imply over-consumption
with respect to the welfarist criterion but, at the same time, over-saving with re-
spect to the paternalistic criterion.
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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the distortionary effects of positional preferences with respect
to both consumption and wealth.1 By positional preferences we mean a situation
in which households not only derive utility from own consumption and wealth,
but also from own consumption and wealth relative to some consumption- and
wealth reference levels. These reference levels are exogenous from the viewpoint
of a household, and partially endogenous from the view of the government.2 In
particular, we have the following case in mind. For a given economy, a part of the
reference level can be explained by choices within that economy. For example, the
average consumption level in an economy might represent an important determinant
for one’s consumption reference level.3 While an economy’s average consumption
level is exogenous to any individual, it is fully endogenous to a social planner,
that is, a government that designs an optimal allocation (or an optimal policy)
according to some welfare criterion. However, there might be further determinants
for reference levels that are not explained by the model itself. Most notably, these
can be foreign consumption- or wealth levels, as transmitted by social media and
television on a daily basis. We consider these determinants to be exogenous to a
social planner. As argued in this paper, the “endogenous-exogenous composition”
of the reference level turns out to be critical for the nature of a possible distortion
(over- or under-saving) caused by positional preferences.
We develop necessary and sufficient conditions for positional preferences to be
non-distortionary. In our simple Ak framework labor is exogenous. That is, the
nature of the distortions we analyze is inter-temporal (in contrast to intra-temporal
distortions when labor supply is elastic). In evaluating distortionary effects, we
1Different authors employ various terms, with slightly varying meanings, to describe positional
preferences. These terms include (negative) consumption externality, relative wealth or consump-
tion, jealousy, envy, keeping or catching up with the Joneses, external habits, positional concerns,
conspicuous wealth or consumption.
2The case in which the reference levels are fully endogenous to a social planner (e.g., the mean
consumption level of an economy) is a special case of our more general framework.
3In models with homogeneous households, virtually all of the literature on positional preferences
assumes the mean consumption level to represent an individual’s consumption reference level.
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consider a paternalistic government in addition to a welfarist government. This is
warranted, as several authors, including Sen (1979) or Harsanyi (1982), argue that
it is questionable to include anti-social preferences, such as envy, in a social wel-
fare function. Private preferences are suitable for a government objective function
only if they are laundered (Goodin, 1986). Their arguments call for a paternalis-
tic welfare function that does not consider positional preferences. However, other
authors are more positive to include positional preferences in a welfare function
(Piketty and Saez, 2013, p.453).4 In this paper we neither adopt a welfarist nor a
paternalistic view. However, we are interested in studying the distortions possibly
caused by positional preferences, as viewed through both lenses – that of a welfarist
government as well as that of a paternalistic government. In this paper, we argue
that – together with partial exogeneity of the reference levels as discussed above –
the same reference levels can imply over-saving according to one welfare criterion,
and, at the same time, under-saving according to the other welfare criterion.
But are positional preferences significant at all? We argue that they are. So-
cial distinction or status is an important motivation of human behavior. This was
already shown by Darwin (1871), who emphasized sexual selection besides natu-
ral selection. “To spread across the population, genes of sexual species not only
need to survive in their natural and social environment, but also need to be or ap-
pear a more attractive mating partner than their same sex competitors.” (Truyts
2010, p.137) Clearly, Darwin was not the first to think about positional prefer-
ences. Philosophers have started to comment on positional preferences more than
2400 years ago. In his The Republic (Book II), Plato argues: Since ... appearance
tyrannizes over truth and is lord of happiness, to appearance I must devote myself.
This passage astoundingly resembles Darwin’s argument on sexual selection. In
more recent times, Easterlin (1995) demonstrated that while national incomes have
increased over the decades, happiness levels have not grown. One explanation for
this Easterlin Paradox is that people have positional preferences, as emphasized by
4An excellent, brief discussion of this question is given by Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman
(2017).
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Clark et al. (2008). The recent literature provides abundant significant empirical
evidence for positional preferences. Pioneering studies include Johansson-Stenman
et al. (2002), Johansson-Stenman and Martinsson (2006), and Solnick and Hemen-
way (1998, 2005). A recent brief discussion is provided in Wendner (2014).
We present several contributions with respect to the prior literature. First, we
identify necessary and sufficient conditions for positional preferences not to im-
pose a distortion (according to either a welfarist or a paternalistic government).
In a framework without wealth-dependent preferences, the prior literature argues
that, positional preferences have no impact on the steady state equilibrium – there-
fore also not a distortionary impact – once labor supply is exogenous.5 We show
that this claim holds true only under the condition of constancy of the degree of
positionality (as discussed in the proceeding section below). Once this condition
is violated, consumption positionality is distortionary in spite of exogenous labor
supply.6 Moreover, in contrast to Nakamoto (2009), we show that consumption
positionality does not imply a distortion once preferences are wealth-dependent.
Specifically, once the consumption positionality matches the wealth positionality,
positional preferences do not cause an inter-temporal distortion.7 Second, we con-
sider a paternalistic welfare criterion in addition to a welfarist one. In the context of
optimal taxation, Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2017), Kanbur and Tuomala
(2013), and Micheletto (2011) investigate optimal non-linear redistributive taxation
5See Brekke and Howarth (2002, p.142), Fisher and Hof (2000, p.249), Liu and Turnovsky
(2005, p.1106), and Rauscher (1997, p.38).
6We also show that existence of a balanced growth path does not imply the constancy-of-
marginal-degree-of-positionality condition.
7Few other papers address the distortionary effects of positional preferences. Alonso-Carrera
et al. (2006) consider an Ak model in which habit-forming households exhibit positional prefer-
ences for consumption. Though, Alonso-Carrera et al. (2006) focus on the interaction between
relative consumption and habits, this paper works out conditions when households are concerned
with both relative consumption and relative wealth. Arrow and Dasgupta (2009) work out the
conditions for the case of endogenous labor supply and positional concerns for both consumption
and leisure. This paper focuses on positional preferences with respect to consumption and wealth,
with exogenous labor supply. Ghosh and Wendner (2017) consider a functionally specified frame-
work with wealth dependent preferences. They do not, however consider a general framework.
None of the aforementioned papers considers partial exogenous reference levels or a paternalistic
government.
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in the presence of positional preferences, discussing a paternalistic welfare criterion.
However, all of these papers are very much in the spirit of the optimal non-linear
income tax tradition with heterogeneous households. None of these papers, though,
consideres either a dynamic setting, or a preference for wealth or partially exoge-
nous reference levels. Third, we address the impact of the “endogenous-exogenous
compositions” of the reference levels on the nature of distortions implied by po-
sitional preferences. To this end, we demonstrate that positional preferences may
give rise to one distortion (like over-saving) according to a welfarist government,
while giving rise to the opposite distortion (under-saving) according to a paternal-
istic government. To the best of our knowledge, no other authors have addressed
and systematically investigated this case before.
To summarize, this paper extends the prior literature with respect to three di-
mensions. First, households may be positional with respect to wealth in addition to
consumption. Second, a household’s reference levels is only partially explained by
endogenous consumption- and savings choices within the economy. A part of the
reference level is exogenous, e.g., determined by choices in a foreign country. As
such, the unexplained part of the reference level is also exogenous to the government
(social utility function). Third, the distortionary effect of positional preferences is
evaluated according to both welfarist- and paternalistic welfare criteria. Exploiting
this extended framework, we show three main results. The presence of consumption-
and wealth positionality does in no way necessarily imply a distortion. Even the
presence of wealth in the utility function does not imply that a consumption ex-
ternality is distortionary, once the degree of positionality with respect to wealth
matches the one with respect to consumption. Next, for given consumption- and
wealth reference levels, our model gives rise to both under-saving and to over-saving
– depending on the extend to which the reference levels are exogenous. Additionally,
we provide conditions for which positional preferences for wealth and consumption
imply under-saving with respect to the welfarist criterion but, at the same time,
over-saving with respect to the paternalistic criterion.
4
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the endogenous growth
model (with inelastic labor supply) for both the market economy and the social op-
tima. Section 3 derives conditions for non-distortionarity of positional preferences.
Moreover, for the cases in which these conditions are not satisfied, the section inves-
tigates the nature of distortions under welfarist- and paternalistic welfare criteria.
Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
We consider a dynamic general equilibrium model of a closed economy that allows
for fully endogenous growth. Endogenous growth stems from constant returns to
capital (Ak model). Time is considered to be continuous. There is a large number
of households and firms, the respective number of which we normalize to unity.
Households are homogeneous and exhibit positional preferences. They derive utility
not only from own consumption but also from own consumption relative to some
consumption reference level, and from own wealth relative to some wealth reference
level.
2.1 Preferences
The representative household has preferences for consumption c, relative consump-
tion ∆c ≡ c− c¯, wealth k, and relative wealth ∆k ≡ k− k¯. Relative consumption is
given by individual consumption relative to some consumption reference level c¯, and
relative wealth is given by individual wealth relative to some wealth reference level
k¯. Both reference levels (c¯, k¯) are exogenous from the point of view of an individual
household.
The consumption- and wealth reference levels are determined by two factors.
The first factor is mean consumption, c¯h, and mean wealth, k¯h, in the economy
(where superscript h suggests home economy). As households are homogeneous,
mean consumption and mean wealth represent natural determinants for the refer-
ence levels. Importantly, these determinants are endogenous from the point of view
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of the government (social planner). The second factor is not explained by our model
itself – it is exogenous: c¯f , k¯f . These “foreign” reference levels are determined by
interaction via social media or by television broadcasting, none of which is explained
endogenously in our model. Importantly, these determinants are exogenous even
to a (welfarist or paternalistic) government. In what follows, we specify relative
consumption ∆c and relative wealth ∆k as
∆c ≡ c− c¯ , c¯ = αh c¯h + αf c¯f , 1 ≥ αh ≥ 0 , αf ≥ 0 , (1)
∆k ≡ k − k¯ , k¯ = βh k¯h + βf k¯f , 1 ≥ βh ≥ 0 , βf ≥ 0 . (2)
Parameters αi and βi, i ∈ {h, f} determine the explained (endogenous) versus not
explained (exogenous) parts of the positional reference levels. The standard case
of fully endogenous mean value comparisons is implied by αh = 1, αf = 0 and
βh = 1, βf = 0.
In this paper, both relative consumption and relative wealth enter the utility
function. The instantaneous utility function is given by:
u(c,∆c, k,∆k) . (3)
In the standard model, uc(c,∆c, k,∆k) > 0, and ui(c,∆c, k,∆k) = 0 for some i ∈
{∆c, k,∆k}, where a subindex refers to the partial derivative: ux(.) ≡ ∂ u(.)/(∂ x).
If u∆c(c,∆c, k,∆k) > 0, preferences exhibit positional concerns for consumption.
For a given other’s consumption level (reference level), a rise in own consumption
raises utility via the increase in relative consumption. If uk(c,∆c, k,∆k) > 0, house-
holds derive utility not only from consumption, but also from wealth. Finally, If
u∆k(c,∆c, k,∆k) > 0, preferences exhibit positional concerns for wealth. For a given
wealth reference level, a rise in own wealth raises relative wealth, thereby it raises
own utility. The time index t is suppressed, unless necessary to avoid ambiguities.
Throughout, we assume that the utility function (3) is strictly quasiconcave,
twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing in c and weakly increasing in
all other arguments.
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The intertemporal utility function, U , as viewed from date t = 0, is given by:
U =
∫ ∞
t=0
u(c,∆c, k,∆k) e
−ρ tdt , ρ > 0 , (4)
where ρ is the household’s constant pure rate of time preference.
2.2 Technology
A homogeneous output, y, is produced by capital according to the linear technology
(Rebelo 1991):
y = Ak , A > 0 (5)
where y is gross production per capita, and k is capital per capita. The depreciation
rate of capital is δ ∈ [0, 1]. We assume (A−δ) ≥ ρ to ensure nonnegative endogenous
growth. Moreover, there is no population growth.
2.3 Market equilibrium
Let the superscript m indicate a market (decentralized) equilibrium. Households
choose a consumption stream so as to maximize intertemporal utility (4) subject
to:
k˙m = ym − cm − δkm = (A− δ)km − cm , (6)
km0 given , (7)
c¯m , k¯m exogenous , (8)
lim
t→∞
µmt k
m
t e
−ρ t = 0 . (9)
Differential equation (6) reflects the flow budget constraint of the representative
household. Restriction (7) is obvious; every household is required to base her plans
on the initial value of her wealth. Notice that (6) and (7) hold for both the mar-
ket framework and a social optimum (as discussed below). Restriction (8) reflects
the fact that individual households consider the positionality reference levels as
exogenous. Finally, (9) is the transversality condition.
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For the market economy, the current value Hamiltonian is given by:
Hm(cm,∆mc , k
m,∆mk , µ
m) = u(cm,∆mc , k
m,∆mk ) + µ
m [(A− δ)km − cm], (10)
where the costate variable µm represents the shadow price of capital. An interior
solution implies the following first-order conditions:
µm = uc(c
m,∆mc , k
m,∆mk ) + u∆c(c
m,∆mc , k
m,∆mk ) , (11)
µ˙m
µm
= −[(A− δ)− ρ]− uk(c
m,∆mc , k
m,∆mk ) + u∆k(c
m,∆mc , k
m,∆mk )
uc(cm,∆mc , k
m,∆mk ) + u∆c(c
m,∆mc , k
m,∆mk )
. (12)
where we made use of the fact that ∂∆c/∂ c = ∂ (c− c¯)/∂ c = 1 and ∂∆k/∂ k = 1
from the point of view of an individual household. For the decentralized economy,
an equilibrium path is characterized by (6), (7), (9), (11), and (12).
Before discussing the welfarist- and paternalistic governments’ problems, it turns
out to be most useful to introduce the concept of the marginal degree of position-
ality (Johansson-Stenman et al., 2002), as a measure of how status concerned or
positional an individual is. Specifically, the marginal degree of positionality with
respect to consumption is defined by
DOPc ≡ u∆c(c
m,∆mc , k
m,∆mk )
uc(cm,∆mc , k
m,∆mk ) + u∆c(c
m,∆mc , k
m,∆mk )
. (13)
The degree of positionality defines the fraction of utility gain from an additional
unit of consumption stemming from a rise in relative consumption ∆c. A value
of zero indicates no positionality at all, while a value of unity indicates that only
relative (not absolute) consumption matters.
Likewise, we define the marginal degree of positionality with respect to wealth
by
DOPk ≡ u∆k(c
m,∆mc , k
m,∆mk )
uk(cm,∆mc , k
m,∆mk ) + u∆k(c
m,∆mc , k
m,∆mk )
. (14)
2.4 Welfarist Government
Let the superscript w indicate variables associated with a welfarist government’s
choice problem. A welfarist government respects individual preferences. Specifi-
cally, it respects consumption and wealth positionality of households. In contrast
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to individual households, the government takes into account that in equilibrium
c¯h = c in (1), and k¯h = k in (2). However, both c¯f and k¯f are considered exoge-
nous. That is, from the point of view of the government, ∆c = c(1 − αh) − αf c¯f ,
and ∆k = k(1− βh)− βf k¯f .
The welfarist government chooses a consumption stream so as to maximize in-
tertemporal utility
U =
∫ ∞
t=0
u(cw,∆wc , k
w,∆wk ) e
−ρ tdt , (15)
subject to
k˙w = (A− δ)kw − cw , (16)
kw0 given , (17)
c¯h = cw , k¯h = kw , (18)
lim
t→∞
µwt k
w
t e
−ρ t = 0 . (19)
Restrictions (16) – (19) have the same interpretations as those given for the market
economy. The main difference with respect to the decentralized framework is the
fact that the social planner takes the reference levels (18) into account.
For the welfarist government, the current value Hamiltonian is given by:
Hw(cw,∆wc , k
w,∆wk , µ
w) = u(cw,∆wc , k
w,∆wk ) + µ
w [(A− δ)kw − cw] . (20)
An interior solution implies the following first-order conditions:
µw = uc(c
w,∆wc , k
w,∆wk ) + (1− αh)u∆c(cw,∆wc , kw,∆wk ) , (21)
µ˙w
µw
= −[(A− δ)− ρ]− uk(c
w,∆wc , k
w,∆wk ) + (1− βh)u∆k(cw,∆wc , kw,∆wk )
uc(cw,∆wc , k
w,∆wk ) + (1− αh)u∆c(cw,∆wc , kw,∆wk )
, (22)
and an equilibrium path is characterized by (16), (17), (19), (21), and (22).
2.5 Paternalistic Government
Should the government accept positional concerns in its welfare criterion? Concerns
for status and relative position are a form of jealousy and envy and one can question
that such behavior has to be respected by the policy maker. In this subsection,
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we set up the paternalistic government’s problem. The government knows that
households care about status but it does not include positional preferences in the
social welfare criterion. That is, the government’s and households’ preferences differ
(cf. Kanbur et al. (2006) for an excellent discussion, in a survey article on non-
welfarist optimal taxation).
In our framework, a paternalistic government does not fully respect individual
preferences. In particular, it neglects positional preferences, that is, it considers
relative consumption and wealth as exogenous: ∆c = ∆¯c and ∆k = ∆¯k, where
(∆¯c, , ∆¯k) is exogenous. In other words, the paternalistic government evaluates an
equilibrium allocation as if households had no positional preferences at all. In the
following, variables related to the paternalistic government’s choice problem are
indicated by the superscript p.
The welfarist government chooses a consumption stream so as to maximize in-
tertemporal utility
U =
∫ ∞
t=0
u(cp, ∆¯c, k
p, ∆¯k) e
−ρ tdt , (23)
subject to
k˙p = (A− δ)kp − cp , (24)
kp0 given , (25)
∆¯c , ∆¯k exogenous , (26)
lim
t→∞
µptk
p
t e
−ρ t = 0 . (27)
Based on the current value Hamiltonian
Hp(cp, kp, µp) = u(cp, ∆¯c, k
p, ∆¯k) + µ
p [(A− δ)kp − cp] , (28)
an interior solution implies the following first-order conditions:
µp = uc(c
p, ∆¯c, k
p, ∆¯k) , (29)
µ˙p
µp
= −[(A− δ)− ρ]− uk(c
p, ∆¯c, k
p, ∆¯k)
uc(cp, ∆¯c, kp, ∆¯k)
. (30)
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3 Positional preferences: efficiency and
distortions
In this section, we address two cases. The first case is the special case in which
households have positional preferences only with respect to consumption. We de-
velop a necessary and sufficient condition for positional preferences to be non-
distortionary and consider the type of distortion occurring when this condition
is not satisfied. As a side, we develop an existence condition for a balanced growth
path and show that existence does not imply efficiency (even for our framework
with exogenous labor supply). The results developed are essential for analyzing the
general second case, in which households have positional preferences with respect
to both consumption and wealth. In the latter framework, we show that both the
type of government (welfarist versus paternalistic) and the exogenous-endogenous
composition of the reference levels play decisive roles for whether or not positional
preferences are distortionary and if so, whether the distortion causes under- or
over-saving.
3.1 Positional concerns with respect to consumption
In this subsection, we focus on the case: u∆k(.) = 0. This is the case in which
households are not concerned about others’ wealth levels, i.e., households may be
positional with respect to consumption but not with respect to wealth. However,
households may be concerned about own absolute wealth, in which case uk(.) > 0.
In order to sharpen our results, we distinguish uk(.) = 0 from the case uk(.) > 0 in
the following.
3.1.1 No preference for wealth: uk(.) = 0
We compare the equilibrium path of a market economy with those of the welfarist-
and paternalistic governments. From (12), (22) and (30), we see that
µ˙m
µm
=
µ˙w
µw
=
µ˙p
µp
= −[(A− δ)− ρ] , (31)
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that is, the growth rates of the shadow prices are identical, and constant, in all
three frameworks (decentralized, welfarist-, and paternalistic government). Effi-
ciency then implies that µm = φw µw = φp µp, with both φw and φp being constants.
From (11), (21) and (29), we can identify
φw =
uc(c,∆c, ., .) + u∆c(c,∆c, ., .)
uc(c,∆c, ., .) + (1− αh)u∆c(c,∆c, ., .)
, φp =
uc(c,∆c, ., .) + u∆c(c,∆c, ., .)
uc(c,∆c, ., .)
,
(32)
who are constant if and only if the utility function is homogeneous of some degree
R in (c,∆c), and the term ∆c/c is constant.
Assumption (A1). The positionality term ∆c/c is constant.
Considering the definition of ∆c in (1), Assumption (A1) is equivalent to requir-
ing the reference level c¯f to be proportional to c. In fact, we assume
c¯f = λc c , 0 < λc <
1− αh
αf
,
where the parameter restriction ensures that in equilibrium (“ex post”) relative
consumption ∆c in fact increases in c. We consider Assumption (A1) to be a weak
assumption, as it merely refers to a a co-movement between the home- (endogenous)
and foreign (exogenous) components of the consumption reference level.
Assumption (A2). Utility function u(c,∆c, ., .) is homogeneous of degree R < 1
in (c,∆c).
Assumptions (A1) and (A2) together have a direct interpretation in terms of the
degree of positionality. They are satisfied if and only if the degree of positionality
with respect to consumption, DOPc, is constant. In fact, considering (13), the
degree of positionality is constant if and only if u∆c = κuc with κ being constant,
in which case φw = (1 + κ)/[1 + κ(1− αh)], and φp = (1 + κ). In the following, we
assume (A1) and (A2), that is,
u∆c = κuc , κ =
u∆c(1, 1− αh − λcαf , ., .)
uc(1, 1− αh − λcαf , ., .) > 0 ,
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where we make use of the fact that both uc and u∆c are homogeneous of degree
(R − 1) by Euler’s theorem. The parameter restriction R < 1 ensures positivity of
endogenous growth, as shown below.
Proposition 1 (u∆k(.) = uk(.) = 0).
If and only if Assumptions (A1) and (A2) are satisfied, the balanced growth path of
the decentralized economy is efficient, that is, it coincides with the one implied by
either the welfarist- or the paternalistic government.
The endogenous growth rate of consumption and capital, g, is given by
gm = gw = gp =
(A− δ)− ρ
(1−R)[1 + κ(1− αh − λcαf )] .
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 1 reveals several important results. Primarily, the presence of consump-
tion positionality does not imply a distortion. Whenever (A1) and (A2) are satisfied,
positional preferences with respect to consumption do not introduce any distortion,
as in Liu and Turnovsky (2005). This result is robust with respect to both welfare
criteria (paternalistic and welfarist) and with respect to the exogenous-endogenous
composition of the reference level. The result is not, however, robust with respect to
having absolute wealth in the utility function, in which case consumption position-
ality always introduces a distortion (see below). Though, the result is “semi-robust”
with respect to having wealth positionality. In this latter case, wealth positionality
may outweigh consumption positionality. That is, consumption positionality can
be non-distortionary in spite of having wealth in the utility function, as discussed
below.8
The parameter restrictions, particularly R < 1, ensure positivity of the endoge-
nous growth rate. As seen in Proposition 1, the growth rate is sensitive with respect
8A homogeneity condition was first introduced by Alonso-Carrera et al. (2006). However,
while their paper concentrates on habits, this paper focuses on positional preferences regarding
(relative) wealth. Proposition 1, though, is essential for the discussion of preferences for wealth.
Interestingly, Arrow and Dasgupta (2009) discuss an equivalent condition to that of Alonso-Carrera
et al. (2006) – however without being aware of their paper.
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to the positionality parameters. In particular, the growth rate decreases in κ, and
it increases in αh and (λcαf ). The degree of positionality is given by κ/(1 + κ) and
rising in κ. A higher κ (a higher DOPc) raises consumption relative to savings in
order to display “status.” Consequently the saving rate falls, and so does the en-
dogenous growth rate (as savings represent the endogenous growth engine). Next,
a higher αh or (λcαf ) directly impacts on ∆c. In particular, for a given increase in
consumption, ∆c grows the less the higher are α
h or (λcαf ). This, in turn, lowers
the rate of decline of the marginal utility of consumption (in equilibrium), as shown
in the appendix (Proof of Proposition 1, Step 1). The lower elasticity of marginal
utility (in absolute terms) raises the optimal growth rate, by standard arguments
of growth theory.
While consumption positionality has an impact on the equilibrium (c/k, g), the
impact is not distortionary, according to Proposition 1. We conclude this subsection
by noting that existence of a balanced growth path does not imply efficiency.
Proposition 2. Existence of a balanced growth path does not imply efficiency.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 2 reveals two important findings. First, there exist balanced growth
paths for which (A1) and (A2) are not satisfied. In fact, as shown in the appendix,
existence of a balanced growth path requires the utility function to be of the fol-
lowing form:
v(c,∆c) = ∆
−γ
c
[
c1−θK1 +K2
1− θ
]
+ Ψ(∆c) , K
1, K2 constants . (33)
If and only if utility is of form (33), there exists a balanced growth path. This
growth path, however, is efficient only under restrictions. For example, if K2 6= 0,
utility function (33) is not homogeneous – thereby the necessary and sufficient effi-
ciency conditions (A1) and (A2) are violated. One example for which consumption
positionality does not introduce a distortion is: K1 = 1, K2 = 0, and Ψ(∆c) is
homogeneous of degree (1− γ − θ).
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Second, even if labor supply is exogenous, consumption positionality can in-
troduce an inter-temporal distortion. This latter result is in stark contrast to the
literature analyzing consumption positionality in a neoclassical framework. The
prior literature has shown that, in a neoclassical model, a consumption externality
does not introduce any distortion as long as labor supply is exogenous.9
In what follows, we show that the result of Proposition 1 is not robust with
respect to preferences for absolute wealth (when, in addition, households are not
wealth-positional).
3.1.2 Preference for wealth: uk(.) > 0, u∆k(.) = 0
In contrast to the previous subsection, we allow households to have a preference
for wealth. Here, households care about own wealth, uk(.) > 0, but they have
no positional preference for wealth, u∆k(.) = 0. We relax this assumption in the
subsequent subsection. To sharpen results, though, we distinguish preferences for
absolute wealth from positional preferences for wealth (when u∆k(.) > 0).
The steps followed here and in the next subsection resemble those of the above
discussion — with the right adjustments, though. There is no change with respect
to the marginal utilities of consumption, as given by (11), (21) and (29). With
uk(.) > 0, (12), (22) and (30) become:
µ˙m
µm
= −[(A− δ)− ρ]− uk(c
m,∆mc , k
m, .)
uc(cm,∆mc , k
m, .) + u∆c(c
m,∆mc , k
m, .)
, (34)
µ˙w
µw
= −[(A− δ)− ρ]− uk(c
w,∆wc , k
w, .)
uc(cw,∆wc , k
w, .) + (1− αh)u∆c(cw,∆wc , kw, .)
, (35)
µ˙p
µp
= −[(A− δ)− ρ]− uk(c
p, ∆¯c, k
p, .)
uc(cp, ∆¯c, kp, .)
. (36)
9Brekke and Howarth (2002, p.142) argue that “we have established that augmenting a stan-
dard neoclassical growth model to incorporate a concern for relative consumption has no impacts
on long-run economic behavior.” Fisher and Hof (2000, p.249) show that the result that “relative
consumption does not affect the long-run steady state...is robust with respect to the specifica-
tion of the instantaneous utility function.” Liu and Turnovsky (2005, p.1106) state that “[w]ith
exogenous labor supply, consumption externalities, which impact through the labor-consumption
tradeoff, have no channel to affect steady state output” in a framework with neoclassical produc-
tion. Rauscher (1997, p.38) argues that “conspicuous consumption does not affect the long-run
steady state.”
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Following the above arguments, for these Euler equations to be satisfied, it is nec-
essary that the right hand sides coincide. Inspection of the right hand sides of (34),
(35) and (36), however, immediately shows the following. If u∆c(c,∆c, k, .) 6= 0,
then, if cit = c
m
t and k
i
t = k
m
t , i ∈ {w, p} for some t, the right hand sides of (34) to
(36) cannot be equal. We therefore conclude:
Proposition 3 (uk(.) > 0, u∆k(.) = 0).
Suppose households have a preference for absolute wealth. Then, if households are
not wealth positional, consumption positionality always introduces a distortion.
Proof. See the discussion above. The restriction to preferences without wealth
positionality is analyzed and discussed in the proceeding section. 
Proposition 3 shows that positional concerns with respect to consumption are always
distortionary, once households have a preference for absolute but not for relative
wealth. This is true, even when Assumptions (A1) and (A2) are satisfied. The
intuition for this result stems from the fact that the marginal rate of substitution of
wealth for consumption always differs between the market equilibrium and the wel-
farist and paternalistic government equilibria. This is so, because households and
the governments have different views with respect to the consumption reference
levels. Individual households take the consumption reference level as exogenous,
that is, ∂∆c/∂ c = 1. The welfarist government considers the marginal disutility
from the endogenous part of reference consumption, that is, ∂∆c/∂ c = (1 − αh).
The paternalistic government disregards relative consumption altogether, that is,
∂∆c/∂ c = 0. For this reason, the marginal rate of substitution of capital for
consumption is the smallest for the market framework and differs from those of
the government-frameworks. As a consequence, the Keynes-Ramsey rules differ be-
tween the market equilibrium and the governments’ optima and so do the respective
consumption-to-capital ratios as well as the endogenous growth rates.
Under the assumptions of Proposition 3, we finally address the question of
whether positional preferences with respect to consumption give rise to over- or
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over-saving. The most efficient way is to work out the endogenous growth rate for
all three frameworks. Noting that c/k = (A− δ)− g, we argue that gm < gi implies
over-consumption, and gm > gi, i ∈ {w, p} implies over-saving.
Without loss of generality, we assume that u(c,∆c, k, .) is homogeneous of degree
Rˆ in k.10 Moreover, we employ the following Lemma, which simplifies the the
proceeding discussion enormously.
Lemma 1. Suppose, the endogenous growth rate is of the form
g = Ω−1 {[(A− δ)− ρ] + Γ c/k} , Ω > 0, Γ > 0. Then, ∂ g/∂ Γ > 0.
Proof. In equilibrium, c/k = (A− δ)− g. Thus,
d g
dΓ
=
Ω−1 [(A− δ)− g]
1 + Ω−1 Γ
> 0 ,
where the sign follows from positivity of c/k. 
The value of Lemma 1 is given by the fact that differences in Γ directly reveal
differences in the endogenous growth rate g, ceteris paribus. A higher Γ implies a
higher growth rate. In light of the above discussion we conclude: Γm < Γi implies
over-consumption, and Γm > Γi, i ∈ {w, p} implies over-saving. We are now ready
to state:
Proposition 4. Suppose households have a preference for absolute wealth, but they
are not wealth positional. Furthermore, assume (A1), (A2) and u(c,∆c, k, .) is
homogeneous of degree Rˆ in k. Then, consumption positionality introduces over-
consumption. The distortion is stronger according to a paternalistic welfare crite-
rion than for a welfarist welfare criterion. That is,( c
k
)m
>
( c
k
)w
>
( c
k
)p
⇔ gm < gw < gp .
Proof. See the appendix.
10Similarly to the proof of Proposition 2, existence requires constancy of uckk/uc. Given as-
sumption (A2), the homogeneity requirement with respect to k is required for the existence of a
balanced growth path.
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Proposition 4 shows an intuitive result. Consumption positionality leads to over-
consumption. However, this intuition is misleading, as the over-consumption result
neither necessarily holds in a framework without a preference for absolute wealth,
nor it necessarily holds in a framework in which individuals also have a positional
preference for wealth.
With a preference for absolute wealth and no positional preference for wealth,
though, the market equilibrium implies over-consumption for both welfare criteria.
By not taking the externality into account, households overestimate the marginal
utility of consumption. That is, they have a lower marginal rate of substitution
of wealth for consumption than either the welfarist- or the paternalistic govern-
ment. Consequently, in light of positional preferences with respect to consumption,
households over-consume. In other words, households under-save, and the endoge-
nous growth rate in the market economy is smaller than that for a welfarist- or
paternalistic framework.
The difference between a welfarist- and a paternalistic government is given by
the fact that the welfarist one considers the marginal disutility from the endogenous
part of reference consumption, while the paternalistic one fully disregards relative
consumption. So, ceteris paribus, marginal utility of consumption is higher for the
welfarist government than for the paternalistic one. Consequently, the welfarist
marginal rate of substitution of wealth for consumption is higher than the pater-
nalistic one. This implies “over-consumption” of the welfarist government relative
to the paternalistic one: (c/k)w > (c/k)p. Equivalently, the saving rate is higher
for the paternalistic equilibrium than for the welfarist one, implying gp > gw.
Proposition 4 emphasizes two aspects of consumption positionality in the pres-
ence of preferences for absolute wealth. First, consumption positionality implies
over-consumption, regardless of the respective welfare criterion. Second, consump-
tion positionality implies a stronger distortion with respect to the paternalistic
welfare criterion than with respect to the welfarist one. In what follows, we show
that positional concerns with respect to wealth introduce a further distortion that
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is capable of offsetting the distortionary effect of relative consumption under wealth
dependent preferences. Moreover, we show that according to a welfarist government
positional preferences may lead to one distortion (say over-consumption) while, at
the same time, they lead to the opposite distortion (over-saving) according to a
paternalistic welfare criterion.
3.2 Positional concerns with respect to consumption and
wealth
In contrast to the subsection above, here we consider the general case in which
households have positional preferences not only with respect to consumption but
also with respect to wealth. That is we consider u∆c > 0 and u∆k > 0. We follow
the methodology developed so far closely and introduce two more assumptions.
Assumption (A3). The positionality term ∆k/k is constant.
Considering the definition of ∆k in (2), Assumption (A3) is equivalent to requir-
ing the reference level k¯f to be proportional to k. In fact, we assume
k¯f = λk k , 0 < λk <
1− βh
βf
,
where the parameter restriction ensures that in equilibrium relative wealth ∆k in
fact increases in k. Again, we consider Assumption (A3) to be a weak assump-
tion on the co-movement between the home- (endogenous) and foreign (exogenous)
components of the wealth reference level.
Assumption (A4). Utility function u(c,∆c, k,∆k) is homogeneous of degree Rˆ in
(k,∆k).
Assumptions (A3) and (A4) together have a direct interpretation in terms of the
degree of positionality. More specifically, assume (A1) to (A4). Then, u∆k = η uk
with η being a constant. Thus, the degree of positionality with respect to wealth,
as given in (14), is constant and given by DOPk = η/(1 + η). Analytically,
u∆k = η uk , η =
u∆c(1, 1− αh − λcαf , 1, 1− βh − λkβf )
uc(1, 1− αh − λcαf , 1, 1− βh − λkβf ) > 0 ,
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where we use (A1) – (A4) together with Euler’s theorem.
In the following, we adopt Assumptions (A1) to (A4). Based on the first-order
conditions (11), (21), (29) as well as on the Euler equations (12), (22), (30), we
state:
Proposition 5 (Non-distortion of positional preferences when u∆k(.) > 0). As-
sume (A1) to (A4).
Paternalistic government: If and only if η = κ, the market equilibrium path is ef-
ficient (according to the paternalistic welfare criterium) and positional preferences
do not introduce a distortion.
Welfarist government: If and only if
1 + η
1 + η(1− βh) =
1 + κ
1 + κ(1− αh)
the market equilibrium path is efficient (according to the welfarist welfare criterium)
and positional preferences do not introduce a distortion.
Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 5 provides necessary and sufficient conditions for positional preferences
not to introduce a distortion. This result is in sharp contrast to the prior literature
(Nakamoto 2009), which argues that positional preferences for consumption always
cause a distortion when households have a preference for wealth. The proposition
offers conditions under which positional preferences do not cause a distortion in
spite of the fact that households have a preference for wealth.
The conditions in Proposition 5 ensure that the costate variables in the market
framework and the governments’ frameworks grow at the the same rates. This is the
case when the distortion introduced by the consumption externality (positionality)
is exactly counterbalanced by the distortion introduced by the wealth externality
(positionality). In terms of the degrees of positionality, the proposition requires the
marginal rate of substitution of wealth for consumption to be equal across the three
frameworks (market, paternalistic, welfarist).
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The reason for the conditions for the paternalistic government to differ from
those for the welfarist government is that the latter does consider the endogenous
parts of the reference levels in the marginal rate of substitution, while the former
does not (we come back to this point below).
Corollary 1 (u∆c(.) = 0, u∆k(.) > 0).
If preferences are positional with respect to wealth but not with respect to consump-
tion, the market equilibrium path is always inefficient, that is, it never coincides
with the socially optimal one.
The corollary follows directly from the fact that η 6= κ = 0. As preferences
depend on relative wealth but not on relative consumption – as there is no coun-
teracting positionality with respect to consumption – the positional preferences are
always distortionary. Corollary 1 provides an interesting insight. While positional
preferences for consumption alone need not be distortionary (cf. Proposition 1),
positional preferences for wealth alone are always distortionary.
We conclude this section by analyzing the type of distortion (over-consumption
or over-saving) caused by positional preferences. Interestingly, we will see that po-
sitional preferences may cause over-consumption according to one welfare criterion
and, at the same time, over-saving according to the other welfare criterion.
As shown in the appendix, the endogenous growth rates are, as above, given by
gi = Ω−1{[(A− δ)− ρ] + Γi (c/k)i} , i ∈ {m,w, p} , (37)
Ω ≡ {(1−R)[1 + κ(1− αh − λcαf )]− Rˆ[1 + η(1− βh − λkβf )]} ,
Γm =
Rˆ
R
1 + η
1 + κ
, Γw =
Rˆ
R
1 + η(1− βh)
1 + κ(1− αh) , Γ
m =
Rˆ
R
, (38)
where Ω−1 represents the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (which is the
same for the market-, welfarist- and paternalistic governments). The specific terms
Γi (c/k)i represent the respective marginal rates of substitution of wealth for con-
sumption. As in the previous section, we can apply Lemma 1, that is ∂ gi/∂ Γi > 0,
in spite of endogeneity of the consumption-to-capital ratio (c/k)i. In contrast to the
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previous section, application of Lemma 1 does not yield a unique ranking among
the Γi, thereby among gi and (c/k)i, i ∈ {m,w, p}.11 The following proposition
identifies all possible rankings or distortions.
Proposition 6 (Welfare criteria, and the endogenous parts of c¯ and k¯). Assume
(A1) to (A4). The positionality parameters give rise to four cases.
I. η = κ and αh = βh. There is no distortion according to either welfare criterion.
II. η = κ. There is no distortion according to the paternalistic welfare criterion.
There is a distortion according to the welfarist welfare criterion when αh 6= βh.
Specifically, αh > βh implies over-consumption; αh < βh implies over-saving.
III. η 6= κ and αh = βh. There is a distortion according to both welfare criteria.
Specifically, κ > η implies over-consumption; κ < η implies over-saving.
IV. η 6= κ and αh 6= βh. Specifically, let κ = nη and βh = aαh, with n, a > 0.
IV.1 Let n, a > 1 and η > (n − a)/[n(a − 1)]. Then positional preferences imply
over-consumption according to the paternalistic welfare criterion and over-saving
according to the welfarist welfare criterion.
IV.2 Let n, a < 1 and η > (n − a)/[n(a − 1)]. Then positional preferences imply
over-saving according to the paternalistic welfare criterion and over-consumption
according to the welfarist welfare criterion.
Proof. Case I follows directly from Proposition 5. Cases II to IV are based on the
the values of Γi as shown above (and derived in the appendix): Γm = Rˆ
R
1+η
1+κ
, Γw =
Rˆ
R
1+η(1−βh)
1+κ(1−αh) , Γ
m = Rˆ
R
. Application of Lemma 1 yields: Γi ≷ Γj ⇔ gi ≷ gj ⇔
(c/k)i ≶ (c/k)j. We associate (c/k)m > (c/k)i , i ∈ {w, p} with over-consumption
and (c/k)m < (c/k)i , i ∈ {w, p} with over-saving. 
If and only if the conditions given in Proposition 5 are not satisfied (Cases II to
IV), positional preferences cause distortions. As long as η = κ (Case II), there is
11Remember, in the framework without wealth positionality, Γm < Γw < Γp. From this we
concluded (c/k)m > (c/k)w > (c/k)p, by Lemma 1.
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no distortion according to the paternalistic government. The reason is that indi-
vidual households and the paternalistic government have the same marginal rate
of substitution of wealth for consumption, as wealth positionality exactly offsets
(equals) consumption positionality. The same does not hold for the welfarist gov-
ernment. By internalizing different amounts of the wealth- and consumption ex-
ternalities (αh 6= βh), the welfarist government’s marginal rate of substitution of
wealth for consumption differs from that of individual households. If, for example,
αh > βh, the welfarist government has a higher marginal rate of substitution of
wealth for consumption (by internalizing relative consumption by more than rela-
tive wealth) than individual households. Therefore, individual households choose a
higher consumption-to-capital ratio than a welfarist government. In other words,
households over-consume relative to the welfarist government. Over-consumption
then implies a lower than optimal endogenous growth rate.
Case II gives rise to a most interesting observation. Suppose dαh = −d (λc αf )
and d βh = −d (λk βf ). Then changes in (αh, βh) do not change the reference levels
(c¯, k¯). Starting from αh = βh, and perturbing either of these parameters yields
either over-consumption (if αh is increased) or over-saving (if βh is increased), for
the same reference levels (c¯, k¯).
According to Case III, η 6= κ always introduces a distortion, though the dis-
tortion is stronger according to the paternalistic criterion as compared to the wel-
farist one (as the paternalistic government disregards positional preferences at all,
while the welfarist government respects individual households’ preferences). Clearly,
κ > η implies over-consumption, as individual households are more positional with
respect to consumption than with respect to wealth compared with both govern-
ments. A parallel argument applies to the case in which κ < η.
Case III implies a ranking according to which either (c/k)m < (c/k)w < (c/k)p
or (c/k)m > (c/k)w > (c/k)p. That is, positional preferences either imply over-
consumption, or they imply over-saving.
Case IV shows that such rankings need not hold if both κ 6= η and αh 6= βh.
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Specifically, positional preferences may imply over-consumption according to one
welfare criterion and over-saving according to the other welfare criterion. Specifi-
cally, suppose κ > η and βh > αh - with the latter inequality being proportionally
larger. Then, following the above arguments, βh > αh implies over-saving accord-
ing to the welfarist criterion, and κ > η implies over-consumption according to
both criteria. The condition given in the proposition ensures that the former ef-
fect dominates the latter effect, that is, there is over-consumption according to the
paternalistic government (which does not care about αh and βh), and there is over-
saving according to the welfarist government. A parallel argument holds for Case
IV.2.
Cases IV.1 and IV.2 raise serious questions regarding the (optimal) policy re-
sponses to positional preferences. Should a government follow a welfarist- or a
paternalistic welfare criterion upon which to base its policy analysis? There is no
easy answer to this question, as discussed in the introduction. In fact, the question
is a philosophical one, it is not a purely economic one. The difficulty comes with
the fact that, depending on the answer to this question, a government should apply
one set of optimal policies rather than another one. In particular, in the presence
of positional preferences, under the conditions of Case IV.1, a paternalistic govern-
ment should apply a consumption tax while a welfarist government should apply a
tax on capital income in order to correct for the externalities. The reverse holds for
Case IV.2.
4 Conclusions
In an endogenous growth context with exogenous labor supply, this paper addresses
the research question of whether or not positional preferences are distortionary,
and if so, whether they cause over-consumption or over-saving. The paper shows
that the answer depends on three main factors: the characteristics of the utility
function (homogeneity characteristics); the type of the welfare criterion (welfarist
or paternalistic); the endogenous-exogenous composition of the reference levels for
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consumption and wealth.
In our framework, labor supply is exogenous. In contrast to a neoclassical growth
framework, as analyzed by the prior literature, we show that in an endogenous
growth framework positional preferences may introduce inter-temporal distortions
in spite of exogenous labor supply. Moreover, we prove that existence of a bal-
anced growth path does not imply efficiency. Efficiency, however, is ensured by a
homogeneity restriction.
When households exhibit a preference for absolute wealth (and not a posi-
tional preference for wealth), then consumption positionality always introduces
over-consumption (under both a welfarist- and a paternalistic government). This
result is not robust, though, with respect to a framework in which households also
have preferences for relative wealth, i.e., they are wealth positional. We provide
necessary and sufficient conditions for non-distortion of positional preferences in
such a framework.
When households are positional, they consider reference points. These reference
points are in part determined by the equilibrium in the home economy (e.g., the
mean consumption level of the economy). However, they are also in part exogenous
(e.g., mean consumption in a foreign country). It turns out that this “endogenous-
exogenous composition” of reference levels plays a key role for whether positional
preferences imply over-consumption or over-saving according to a welfarist govern-
ment. The reasoning is as follows. Individual households consider reference levels
as exogenous, while the welfarist government internalizes the endogenous parts of
the reference levels. Depending on their endogenous-exogenous composition, the
welfarist government can have a higher- or a lower marginal rate of substitution of
wealth for consumption, than an individual household.
In addition to a welfarist government, we also consider a paternalistic one that
does not include “anti-social preferences”, such as consumption- or wealth position-
ality in its social welfare function. We discuss two cases in particular. First, when
the endogenous-exogenous composition is the same for both the consumption- and
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the wealth reference level, the distortion of positional preferences, if any, is stronger
under a paternalistic government than under a welfarist one. This is because the
former completely disregards any positional preferences, while the latter consid-
ers (the endogenous) part of the reference levels. Second, we identify the cases for
which distortions raised by positional preferences imply over-consumption according
to the welfarist criterion, while implying over-saving according to the paternalistic
criterion. These cases involve restrictions on both, the degrees of positionality with
respect to consumption or wealth as well as the endogenous-exogenous compositions
of the reference levels.
A number of further research questions suggest themselves. First of all, which
optimal policy should be chosen in those cases for which distortions raised by posi-
tional preferences imply over-consumption according to one welfare criterion, while
implying over-saving according to the other criterion. This question clearly is of
interest in a much broader context than the one discussed in this paper. Second, if
households are heterogeneous in terms of wealth, skills or preferences, what can sys-
tematically be said about distortionary effects of positional preferences and about
optimal redistributive taxation? Third, how do the results presented in this study
change in a model with an endogenous (e.g., wealth-driven) time preference?
Notwithstanding these limitations, we hope this study clarifies important as-
pects of distortionary effects of positional preferences, and can contribute to future
discussions about the effects of positional preferences in economics.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
We consider km0 = k
w
0 = k
p
0. It is easy to show that – as in the standard Ak frame-
work – the dynamic system is one-dimensional, and the steady state is unstable.
That is, there is no transitional dynamics, and consumption and capital grow at
their balanced growth rates “from the beginning.” This argument follows standard
textbook reasoning.
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Step 1. Consumption and capital grow at the same rate. The endogenous growth
rate of the market economy equals that of the (welfarist- and paternalistic) govern-
ment: gm = gw = gp.
Given that consumption and capital grow at their balanced growth rates “from the
beginning,” k˙/k is constant, and (6) requires c to grow at the same rate as k. Let g
denote this growth rate. In the following we show that g = c˙/c is the same for the
decentralized economy as for the welfarist-/paternalistic government. As a matter
of fact, although µm 6= µw 6= µp, from (11), (21), (29) it follows that the growth
rates of the costate variables are the same: µ˙m/µm = µ˙w/µw = µ˙p/µp = u˙c/uc.
12
That is,
µ˙i
µi
=
u˙c
i
uic
=
uccc
uc
c˙
c
+
uc∆cc
uc
∆˙c
c
, i ∈ {m,w, p} .
Next, we observe that (i) ∆˙c/c = (1−αh−λcαf )c˙/c; (ii) uc∆c = u∆cc = ∂ u∆c/∂ c =
∂ κuc/∂ c = κucc; (iii) by homogeneity of degree R, uccc/uc = −(1−R). Considering
(i) to (iii) together with (31) yields
gi =
(
c˙
c
)i
=
(A− δ)− ρ
(1−R)[1 + κ(1− αh − λcαf )] , i ∈ {m,w, p} . (39)
Step 2. As gm = gw = gp we have cmt = c
w
t = c
p
t for all t ≥ 0. For t = 0, observe that
km0 = k
w
0 = k
p
0. From (6), (16) and (24), c0 = [(A− δ)− g] k0. As km0 = kw0 = kp0, it
follows that cm0 = c
w
0 = c
p
0. Finally, as the growth rates are identical, we also have
cmt = c
w
t = c
p
t for all t > 0.
Step 3. The transversality conditions (TVC) are satisfied. Let uˆ ≡ u(1, 1 − αh −
λcαf , ., .). We have µm = R(1 + κ)uˆcR−1 6= µw = R(1 + κ(1 − αh))uˆcR−1 6= µp =
RuˆcR−1. Next we consider µit = µ
i
0 e
−[(A−δ)−ρ]t, i ∈ {m,w, p}, ct = c0 egt, and
kt = k0 e
gt. Plugging these expressions into the respective TVC yields the following
necessary and sufficient condition for the TVC (in all three frameworks) to be
satisfied: (A− δ) > g. This condition, however, is satisfied in all three frameworks
(market, welfarist, paternalistic), as c/k = (A− δ)− g > 0.
12Observe that the growth rate u˙c/uc is independent of whether or not c¯ or ∆¯c is exogenous to
the decision maker.
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From steps 1 to 3 we conclude that all equilibrium paths are identical, therefore the
decentralized equilibrium path is efficient according to either the welfarist or the
paternalistic welfare criterion. 
Proof of Proposition 2
Let v(c,∆c) ≡ u(c,∆c, ., .). Throughout we assume that (A1) is satisfied. Efficiency
requires
v∆c(c,∆c)
vc(c,∆c)
= constant , (EF)
and existence of a balanced growth path requires a constant growth rate of the
costate variable:
µ˙
µ
=
vcc(c,∆c)c
vc(c,∆c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
!
= constant
c˙
c
+
vc∆c(c,∆c)∆c
vc(c,∆c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
!
= constant
∆˙c
∆c
= constant . (EX)
Both c˙/c and ∆˙c/∆c are constant on a balanced growth path. The existence con-
dition is satisfied if both elasticities of marginal utility are constant as well.
As demonstrated in the proof of Proposition 1, efficiency conditions (A1) and
(A2) imply constancy of both elasticities of marginal utility. That is, (EF)⇒ (EX).
The reverse does not hold, though.
Assume (EX), and let θ and γ denote the elasticities:
θ ≡ −vcc(c,∆c)c
vc(c,∆c)
, γ ≡ −vc∆c(c,∆c)∆c
vc(c,∆c)
. (40)
From this information, we first derive the marginal utility of consumption. In the
proceeding step, we use the result to infer the utility function.
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Step 1. Marginal utility
vc∆c(c,∆c)
vc(c,∆c)
=
d
d∆c
ln vc(c,∆c) = − γ
∆c
⇒
∫
d
d∆c
ln vc(c,∆c) d∆c = −
∫
γ
∆c
d∆c = −γ ln ∆c + ξ
⇒ ln vc(c,∆c) + fˆ(c) = −γ ln ∆c + ξ
⇒ ln vc(c,∆c) = ln(∆−γc ) + f(c) , f(c) ≡ ξ − fˆ(c)
⇒ eln vc(c,∆c) = eln(∆−γc ) ef(c)
⇒ vc(c,∆c) = ∆−γc ef(c) ,
where ξ and fˆ(c) are constants of integration.
Step 2. Utility. Integrating the above with respect to c yields:∫
d
d c
v(c,∆c)dc = ∆
−γ
c
∫
ef(c)dc︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ϕ(c)
⇒ v(c,∆c)−Ψ(∆c) = ∆−γc ϕ(c)
⇒ v(c,∆c) = ∆−γc ϕ(c) + Ψ(∆c) ,
where Ψ(∆c) is a constant of integration. Next, we use constancy of the elasticity
of marginal utility again, to obtain an expression for ϕ(c). Solving the differential
equation yields:
ϕ(c) =
c1−θK1
1− θ + Kˆ
2
where K1 and Kˆ2 are arbitrary constants of integration. Setting Kˆ2 = K2/(1− θ)
yields (33). 
Proof of Proposition 4
Our starting point is (11), (21), (29). Based on these first-order conditions, the
growth rate of the respective costate variable is the same for all three, the market-,
the welfarist- and the paternalistic framework:
µ˙
µ
=
u˙c
uc
=
uccc
uc
c˙
c
+
uc∆cc
uc
∆˙c
c
+
uckk
uc
k˙
k
.
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We assume (A1) and (A2). As shown above, the two elasticities of marginal utility
of consumption with respect to c and ∆c are constant. By homogeneity of degree Rˆ
in k, elasticity uckk/uc becomes uckk/uc = Rˆ and is also constant. Next, considering
that along a balanced growth path k˙/k = c˙/c, and ∆˙c/∆c = (1−αh− λcαf )c˙/c, as
well as u∆c = κuc, we evaluate
µ˙
µ
= −Ω c˙
c
, (41)
where Ω ≡ {(1−R)[1+κ(1−αh−λcαf )]−Rˆ}, and Ω−1 represents the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution. It is important to notice that, in equilibrium, Ω is the
same for the market- as well as the welfarist- and paternalistic governments.
Next, we consider, the right hand sides of (34), (35), and (36). Observe that
the homogeneity properties imply uk/uc = (Rˆ/R)(c/k). Suppressing arguments, it
is easy to derive
umk
umc + u
m
∆c
=
umk
umc (1 + κ)
=
Rˆ
R(1 + κ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Γm
( c
k
)m
, (market)
uwk
uwc + (1− αh)uw∆c
=
uwk
uwc [1 + κ(1− αh)]
=
Rˆ
R[1 + κ(1− αh)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Γw
( c
k
)w
, (welfarist government)
upk
upc
=
Rˆ
R︸︷︷︸
≡Γp
( c
k
)p
, (paternalistic government)
so that Γp > Γw > Γm. Combining with (41) yields
gi = Ω−1{[(A− δ)− ρ] + Γi (c/k)i} , i ∈ {m,w, p} .
We can directly apply Lemma 1 to infer
gp > gw > gm ⇔
( c
k
)p
<
( c
k
)w
<
( c
k
)m
(42)
where the latter inequalities follow from the fact that (c/k) = (A− δ)− g. 
Proof of Proposition 5
Step 1. The homogeneity conditions (A1) – (A4) are equivalent to constancy of the
marginal rates of substitution u∆c/uc, u∆k/uk, uk/uc.
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Step 2 (Paternalistic government). Following the reasoning above, the following
must hold
uk + u∆k
uc + u∆c
=
uk
uc
⇔ uk(1 + η)
uc(1 + κ)
=
uk
uc
⇔ η = κ ,
where the first term on the left hand side represents the marginal rate of substitu-
tion of wealth for consumption in a market framework, and the term to the right
of the equality sign represents the marginal rate of substitution of wealth for con-
sumption for a paternalistic government. Together with (A1) – (A4), the condition
is necessary and sufficient for positional preferences to be non-distortionary.
Step 3 (Welfarist government). Similarly, following the reasoning above, the follow-
ing must hold:
uk + u∆k
uc + u∆c
=
uk + (1− βh)u∆k
uc + (1− αh)u∆c
⇔ uk(1 + η)
uc(1 + κ)
=
uk[1 + η(1− βh)]
uc[1 + κ(1− αh)]
⇔ 1 + η
1 + η(1− βh) =
1 + κ
1 + κ(1− αh) ,
which completes the proof. 
Endogenous growth rate in the general case
We apply the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 4. However, here, we
additionally take into account the positional preference for wealth.
Step 1. The growth rate of the costate variable becomes
µ˙
µ
=
u˙c
uc
=
uccc
uc
c˙
c
+
uc∆cc
uc
∆˙c
c
+
uckk
uc
k˙
k
+
uc∆kk
uc
∆˙k
k
.
Considering (A1) – (A4) together with requirement that c˙/c = k˙/k for a balanced
growth path, yields
µ˙
µ
= −Ω c˙
c
⇒ g = −Ω−1 µ˙
µ
, (43)
where Ω ≡ {(1 − R)[1 + κ(1 − αh − λcαf )] − Rˆ[1 + η(1 − βh − λkβf )]}, and Ω−1
represents the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, as above.
Step 2. For calculating µ˙/µ, consider the right hand sides of (12), (22), and (30)
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in order to evaluate the marginal rates of substitution of wealth for consumption.
Specifically,
umk + u
m
∆k
umc + u
m
∆c
=
umk (1 + η)
umc (1 + κ)
=
Rˆ(1 + η)
R(1 + κ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Γm
( c
k
)m
, (market)
uwk + (1− βh)uw∆k
uwc + (1− αh)uw∆c
=
uwk [1 + η(1− βh)]
uwc [1 + κ(1− αh)]
=
Rˆ[1 + η(1− βh)]
R[1 + κ(1− αh)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Γw
( c
k
)w
, (welfarist government)
upk
upc
=
Rˆ
R︸︷︷︸
≡Γp
( c
k
)p
. (paternalistic government)
It is easy to see that the ranking of the expressions Γi, as derived for the proof of
Proposition 4, does not hold here. 
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